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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ON SALE BAR
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE STRUCTURE AND
NEGOTIATION OF DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS
Mark Levy∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

Development agreements are commonly used to define the
relationship between contracting parties regarding the development of new
product technologies. Frequently, development agreements provide that
one party, usually the inventor-supplier of the new product technology,
deliver prototypes for evaluation by the prospective buyer. In many cases,
testing and evaluation of the prototypes make up a feasibility stage that is
prefatory to a second supply phase under which the inventor-supplier will
manufacture and supply the buyer’s requirements for the new product. The
stage of development of the invention at the time these agreements are
executed can vary widely. The invention may be no more than a naked
concept, or it may have been actually reduced to practice. In relation to the
stage of development of the invention, the purpose of the development
agreement can also vary. The agreement may be designed to evaluate
market potential, or the agreement may be designed to show that the
invention can indeed function as it was intended. The purpose of many
pharmaceutical development agreements is to do the testing required to
register the drug with the Food and Drug Administration.
As a consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc.,1 inventor-suppliers who offer development
agreements must negotiate and structure their agreements carefully based
on the purpose and the stage of development of the invention; otherwise
valuable intellectual property rights can be lost inadvertently. In Pfaff, the
court established a two-prong test for determining the applicability of the
on sale bar.2 The first prong requires a “commercial offer for sale” of the
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Mark Levy is a partner in the Dayton, Ohio office of Thompson Hine LLP and Group Leader of its
Intellectual Property Practice Group. He can be reached at 2000 Courthouse Plaza, N.E., 10 W. Second
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525 U.S. 55 (1998).
2
See infra pt. II (defining the on sale bar).
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invention; the second requires that the invention has evolved to the point
that it is “ready for patenting.”3 When these two conditions are met, the on
sale bar is triggered and one year later the invention can no longer be
patented.4
In contrast to pre-Pfaff standards, under the “ready for patenting”
standard, development contracts that provide for the transfer of prototypes
or include terms and conditions for the sale of the invention implicate the
on sale bar. Once the invention is “ready for patenting,” unless the sale
qualifies as an experimental use of the invention, the statutory one year
period begins to run.
If the invention does not exist or is not ready for patenting at the
time of an offer for sale, the offer is an inchoate bar that begins to run when
the invention is ready for patenting.5 The bar is considered inchoate
because the invention has not been developed to the point that the first
prong of the Pfaff test is satisfied.6 Once both prongs of the Pfaff test are
satisfied, the one-year statutory period begins to run regardless of whether
the invention is first offered for sale or is first ready for patenting.7 Thus,
an invention that is conceived and brought to a point that it is ready for
patenting under a development agreement that includes an offer for sale,
may trigger the on sale bar as of one year from the date the invention
becomes ready for patenting. This requires that the inventor and his or her
counsel be vigilant. As soon as the invention matures to the point that it is
ready for patenting, the one-year clock starts to run.
This paper will start by reviewing the history and policies
underlying the on sale bar and the experimental use exception, then it will
examine approaches to development agreements that will minimize
exposure to the on sale bar.
II.
A.

SUMMARY OF THE ON SALE BAR

Brief History

The on sale bar is codified by 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which states: “[a]
person shall be entitled to a patent unless -- (b) the invention was patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public

3

Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 67.
Robotic Vision Sys. ,Inc. v. View Engr., 249 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001); IGT v. Global Gaming
Tech., 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 13336 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1999).
6
Robotic, 249 F.3d at 1313.
7
Id.
4
5
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use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States.” 8
The on sale bar was first
enacted by Congress in the Patent Act of 1836, which prescribed an
absolute bar to a patent if the inventor had given permission for his
invention to be on sale before the patent application was filed.9 In the
Patent Act of 1839, Congress enacted a grace period that permitted an
invention to be on sale up to two years prior to filing the patent
application.10 In 1939, that grace period was reduced to one year as it
stands today.11
B.

Underlying Policies

The policy considerations underlying the on sale bar have shaped
its development.12 Four important policies underlying § 102(b) were
outlined by the Court of Claims, a predecessor of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, in General Electric Company v. United States.13 They
are: (1) a policy against removal of inventions from the public that the
public has come to believe are freely available to all as a consequence of
prolonged sales activity; (2) a policy in favor of prompt and widespread
disclosure of new inventions to the public; (3) a policy against allowing
inventors to commercially exploit the exclusivity afforded by the patent
beyond the statutorily prescribed period; and (4) a policy in favor of
affording an inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity
to determine whether filing for patent is a worthwhile investment.14 The
Federal Circuit has held that these policies are not just background rules
but, in effect, define the on sale bar.15 As a result, courts have weighed
these policies in determining the applicability of the on sale bar.
C.

Degree of Completion /Availability of the Invention

The principal issue that the court resolved (at least to its thinking)
in Pfaff was one with which the courts had struggled for years; namely, at
what stage of development of an invention does the on sale bar become
applicable when the invention has been the subject of an offer for sale.
Over the last 40 years, different bright line rules and tests were proposed to
address this issue. One problem inherent to establishing any standard for

8

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004).
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836).
10
Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
11
Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (1939).
12
J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
13
654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
14
Id.
15
RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
9
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determining when the on sale bar arises is that the inventions that are
protectable under the patent statute and therefore subject to the on sale bar
are quite diverse in terms of their subject matter, complexity, and the
amount of testing required before the inventor knows that he or she “has”
an invention. For example, they may range from genetically engineered
medicines to simple mechanical devices to methods for doing business.
The suitability or functionality of some inventions is self-evident at the
moment of their conception; for other inventions, substantial testing under
real world conditions is required. Some inventions can be reduced to
practice at the moment that they are conceived, whereas, according to the
Federal Circuit, others are not conceived until they have actually been
reduced to practice.16
At one time court decisions used the “on hand” rule in applying the
on sale bar.17 The on hand rule required that the invention be manufactured
and on hand for delivery before the on sale bar could be triggered.18 As the
court stated in Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery,
Ltd.,19 this standard required that “a device incorporating the invention must
have existed in its ordinary or contemplated usable form, and must have
been on hand and ready for delivery more than one year prior to the patent
application filing date.”20 Thus, the invention not only needed to be
reduced to practice but also needed to be commercially available for
delivery to invoke the on sale bar. The rationale behind this standard was
that an invention was not capable of being sold unless it was available for
delivery to a customer. However, this allowed inventors to circumvent the
application of the on sale bar by controlling production and delivery times
of their inventions, and as a result, courts found a need to adopt a tighter
standard.21
In Timely Products Corporation v. Arron,22 the court rejected the
on hand doctrine in favor of the “reduction to practice” standard. 23 The
court outlined a three-part test for the on sale bar: (1) the complete
invention claimed must have been embodied in or obvious in view of the
thing offered for sale; (2) the invention must have been tested sufficiently to
verify that it is operable and commercially marketable; and (3) the sale

16

See Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
See e.g. Burke Elec. Co. v. Indep. Pneumatic Tool Co., 232 F. 145 (2d Cir. 1916); McCreery Engr.
Co. v. Mass. Fan Co., 195 F. 498 ( 1st Cir. 1912).
18
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Timely Prod. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1975).
22
Id.
23
Id.
17
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must have been primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes.24
The third requirement reflected the experimental use doctrine. The second
requirement, however, distinguished the analysis as it essentially required
that the invention be “reduced to practice,” that is, the invention must have
been constructed and demonstrated to work for its intended purpose in
order to invoke the on sale bar.25
Although the “reduction to practice” standard had the advantage of
being readily ascertainable, it was the subject of criticism because inventors
could commercially exploit their inventions more than a year prior to filing
if the invention was not actually reduced to practice.26 This again allowed
the inventor to circumvent the on sale bar while reaping the commercial
benefits beyond the prescribed one-year statutory period.27
D.

"Totality of the Circumstances” Test

In UMC Electronics Company v. United States,28 the Federal
Circuit took yet another approach to the on sale bar. Noting that “reduction
to practice of the claimed invention has not been and should not be made an
absolute requirement of the [on sale] bar,” 29 the court instead established a
“totality of the circumstances” analysis stating that consideration should be
given to “[a]ll of the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell,
including the stage of development of the invention and the nature of the
invention weighed against the policies underlying section 102(b).”30 The
totality of circumstances test was, however, inherently vague. It was
incapable of providing a fixed standard by which inventors could determine
whether an offer for sale would trigger the on sale bar based on the extent
of development of their inventions. This caused even more confusion for
the courts, and the inconsistency in the Federal Circuit’s subsequent
decisions regarding the on sale bar reflected this confusion.
Micro Chemical Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co., Inc.31 is one of
a series of cases in which the Federal Circuit elaborated upon the totality of
the circumstances analysis. The court had construed UMC to require that
“a sale or definite offer to sell a substantially completed invention, with
reason to expect that it would work for its intended purpose upon

24

Id. at 302.
Id.
26
See UMC Elec. Co. v. U.S., 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
27
Barmag, 731 F.2d at 837.
28
816 F.2d 647.
29
Id. at 656.
30
Id.
31
103 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
25
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completion, suffices to generate a statutory bar.”32 In Micro, the patentee
had not built a working prototype before offering the invention for sale, and
after the offer, when the prototype was finally built, it did not work
satisfactorily. These facts spawned yet another standard: an invention must
be “substantially complete” to trigger the on sale bar. But once again, the
standard was indefinite.33
In Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Construction,34 a case
that involved the sale of an all-weather athletic running track, the court held
that “the general rule is that the on-sale bar starts to accrue when a
completed invention is offered for sale.”35 According to the court, this
gives the inventor more guidance as to when an invention is subject to the
on sale bar.36
E.

Pfaff v. Wells - "Ready for Patenting" Standard

The different standards that the courts used in addressing the on
sale bar prior to Pfaff set the stage for the Supreme Court to step in and
attempt to establish a bright line rule.
1.

Factual Background

In November 1980, Pfaff was contacted by Texas Instruments
(“TI”) to develop a socket for TI’s leadless chip carriers.37 The sockets
were relatively simple mechanical devices.38 Indeed, Pfaff created
drawings of the concept during a meeting with TI,39 and according to
footnote three of the court's opinion, the inventor routinely went directly
from the drawing board to hard tooling. On April 8, 1981, a TI
representative issued a purchase order to Pfaff's company for 30,100 of the
sockets.40 After he tested the sockets, Pfaff shipped the sockets to TI.41
Pfaff filed a patent application for the socket on April 19, 1982, making the
critical § 102(b) date for filing April 19, 1981.42
Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, Inc. for infringement of the patent and

32

Id. at 1545.
Id.
34
98 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
35
Id. at 1324.
36
Id. at 1323.
37
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 55.
38
See U.S. Patent No. 4,491,377 (issued Jan. 1, 1985).
39
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 58.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
33
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Wells claimed that Pfaff's invention was invalid under the on sale bar.43
The district court held that the invention was not on sale under § 102(b)
because there was no physical embodiment at the time of sale.44 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit used the “substantially complete” standard and ruled
that although there was no physical embodiment of the invention at the time
of the offer for sale, it was "substantially complete" because there was
“reason to expect that it would work for its intended purpose upon
completion.”45
2.

Ready for Patenting

The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision of the
invalidity of Pfaff’s invention.46 However, the court outlined a different
standard for determining whether an invention has reached a stage of
development at which it can be considered on sale if it is the subject of a
commercial offer.47 The court framed the issue as “whether the commercial
marketing of a newly invented product may mark the beginning of the 1year period even though the invention has not yet been reduced to
practice.”48 The Supreme Court's analysis began with its conclusion that
the word “invention in the Patent Act . . . refers to the inventor's conception
rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea.”49 The court concluded
that the statute does not require an invention to be “reduced to practice
before it can be patented” and said that Pfaff could have obtained a patent
on his invention when he accepted the purchase order before there was a
physical embodiment of the invention.50 The court cited The Telephone
Cases.51 In those cases, Bell's patent was upheld “even though he had filed
his application before constructing a working telephone.”52 Bell did not
have a physical embodiment of the telephone, but he did have detailed
drawings, which allowed a “good mechanic of proper skill in matters of the
kind . . . [to] construct an apparatus.”53 Using parallel reasoning, the court
concluded that Pfaff's drawings had “‘sufficient clearness and precision to
enable those skilled in the matter’ to produce the [chip carriers].”54

43

Id.
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
46
Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55.
47
Id. at 57.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 60.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 61-62.
52
Id. at 61 (citing The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888)).
53
Id. at 62 (citing The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888)).
54
Id. at 63.
44
45
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Analysis of the Standard

In Pfaff, the court took a very pragmatic approach to the on sale
bar. Pfaff was barred because he could have filed a patent application by
the critical date.55 Once the invention is ready for patenting, the policies of
encouraging prompt filing and allowing the inventor time to determine
whether the invention is commercially viable without unjustifiably
extending the patent monopoly appear to be mutually accommodated. Until
the invention is ready for patenting, the inventor is not in a position to file,
and logically, under the ready for patenting standard, the inventor is not
penalized for delaying to file until the invention is ready.
In footnote fourteen of the Pfaff decision, the court rejected a
theory advanced by the Solicitor General that any invention that is the
subject of an offer for sale should be barred from patent protection a year
later without regard to the stage of development of the invention at the time
of the offer.56 The court explained in the footnote that the theory
underlying the Solicitor General's standard fails because it does not
consider whether aspects of the invention were developed after the critical
date.57
According to the court, “ready for patenting” can be proved in at
least two ways: “by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or
by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or
other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a
person skilled in the art to practice the invention.”58 Based on The
Telephone Cases, the court noted that an invention can be “complete and
ready for patenting” before it has actually been reduced to practice. The
court then interpreted statements in its earlier decisions to the effect that an
invention is complete when it is reduced to practice as meaning that
“reduction to practice demonstrates that an invention is no longer in an
experimental phase.”59 Reduction to practice is thus a trailing indicator that
an invention is ready for patenting.
“Ready for patenting” appears to merge two concepts: (1) the

55
The term “critical date” is used in this article as it is used in many of the reported cases to refer to the
date one year before the application filing date.
56
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68 n. 14.
57
This suggests that proof that subsequent developments were required to provide an enabling
disclosure will indicate that an invention is not ready for patenting. There is an important patent
drafting lesson here. To avoid prematurely qualifying as ready for patenting, post-critical date
developments should be disclosed and emphasized in the application.
58
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
59
Id. at 66.
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concept of complete conception of the invention, and (2) the concept of an
enabling disclosure. In addressing the standard applied by the Federal
Circuit, the court noted: “[t]he word 'invention' must refer to a concept that
is complete rather than merely one that is 'substantially complete.’”60 But,
“ready for patenting” is not synonymous with complete conception. If it
were, presumably the court would have used the latter term. “Ready for
patenting” requires something more than conception but something less
than reduction to practice. That “something extra” appears at least to be an
enabling disclosure or the ability to provide an enabling disclosure.
4.

Conviction of Success v. Mere Hope

Pfaff dealt with a predictable art. The Pfaff Court did not address
the result under the ready for patenting analysis when an inventor is able to
prepare an enabling but untested disclosure in less predictable arts.
Unfortunately, the Pfaff Court did not comment on a key point underlying
the Federal Circuit's decision, that Pfaff had “reason to expect that the
invention would work for its intended purpose.”61 An inventor can write a
disclosure that later turns out to be enabling, yet not know (with varying
degrees of uncertainty) that it will work. In Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,62 the Federal Circuit acknowledged that in the case
of a complex invention, “development and verification” (and not just
description) may be needed in order to prepare a patent application:
[If] the inventor himself was uncertain whether it could be
made to work, a bare conception that has not been enabled
is not a completed invention ready for patenting. Although
conception can occur before the inventor has verified that
his idea will work, [citation omitted] when development
and verification are needed in order to prepare a patent
application that complies with § 112, the invention is not
yet ready for patenting.63
The ultimate question of whether an invention has been placed on
sale in violation 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is a question of law which will be
reviewed de novo.64 To establish an on sale bar, it must be shown that the
device sold or offered for sale fully anticipated the claimed invention or
would have rendered the claimed invention obvious in view of the prior

60

Id.
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1434, (quoting Micro, 103 F.2d at 1545).
62
271 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
63
Id. at 1080.
64
Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich., Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
61
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art.65 One problem with the “ready for patenting” standard is that it is a
backward looking infringer’s defense as opposed to a forward looking
inventor’s standard. In litigation, the patent is presumed valid under 35
U.S.C. § 282 and the defendant-infringer bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the invention was ready for patenting by
the critical date.66 The defendant-infringer may be able to carry this burden
by showing (1) a disclosure prior to the critical date; and (2) that the
invention later worked in the manner in which it was disclosed. The
inventor’s brilliance may work against him. Pfaff himself may have been a
victim. He proudly testified:
Q: You are satisfied, obviously, when you come up with
some drawings that it is going to go – “it works”?
A: I know what I'm doing, yes, most of the time.67
In Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc.,68 the
Federal Circuit dismissed the inventor’s professed uncertainty regarding the
operability of his invention.69 An inventor’s belief that his invention will
work is not, as a matter of the patent law that has been developed in making
priority determinations in interferences, an element of the act of conception,
but it should be an element of “ready for patenting.”70 An inventor cannot
realistically be expected to file for patent protection until he or she has
some conviction, or at least some reasonable expectation or confidence, that
the invention is capable of providing the desired function or result.
The Robotic decision may be distinguished as one involving readily
predictable subject matter in which the inventor's doubts regarding the
functionality of his invention simply appeared unrealistic or disingenuous
to the court.71 Where the invention is untested and the art is less
predictable, “ready for patenting” should arguably provide an opportunity
to test the invention. If not to the point of a full-fledged reduction-topractice, it should be tested at least to the point at which the inventor can
determine that no further developmental work is required to enable one
skilled in the art to practice his or her invention, or require that the
invention has enough rudimentary functionality to justify filing. Therefore,
in less predictable arts, the ready for patenting analysis will include not

65

Id.
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
67
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 58.
68
249 F.3d 1307.
69
Id. at 1312-13.
70
See Space Systems, 271 F.3d 1076.
71
See Robotic, 249 F.3d 1307.
66
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only an enabling disclosure, but also a reasonable expectation of success.
Indeed, early Supreme Court cases state that the on sale bar does not attach
to a naked idea.72
Time will tell, but the logic that underlies Federal Circuit decisions,
such as Burroughs Wellcome Company v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,73 holding
that for some inventions, conception does not occur until reduction to
practice, may shift the ready for patenting analysis toward reduction to
practice in less predictable arts.74 In Burroughs, the Federal Circuit
explained the need for a complete conception this way:
The conception analysis necessarily turns on the inventor’s
ability to describe the invention with particularity. Until he
can do so, he can not prove possession of the complete
mental picture of the invention. These rules ensure that
patent rights attach only when an idea is so far developed
that the inventor can point to a definite particular
invention.75
The same “rules” the Burroughs Court referenced are arguably also useful
to insure that the on sale bar attaches “only when an idea is so far
developed that the inventor can point to a definite particular invention.”76
In Hitzeman v. Rutter,77 the court denied Hitzeman the benefit of his naked
conception, noting, “[n]othing in the record suggests that Hitzeman had a
reasonable expectation that using yeast as a host cell, rather than bacteria,
would yield successful assembly of particles.”78 The court characterized
Hitzeman’s conception as a “mere hope.”79 Clearly, if “mere hope” is
insufficient to constitute conception, it should likewise fail in the ready for
patenting analysis.
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has already exhibited a
willingness to jettison interference principals underlying “conception” in
performing the ready for patenting analysis.80 In Scaltech, Inc. v.
Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.,81 in a decision authored by Judge Dyk, the court held a

72

See Space Systems, 271 F.3d at 1080.
40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
74
Id. at 1228.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
243 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
78
Id. at 1357.
79
Id.
80
Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
81
Id.
73
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process patent invalid based on an offer to carry out the process for value.82
The process was for producing petroleum coke from a petroleum waste and
the broadest claim in the patent recited a suspension having a defined
particle size.83 The patentee lost even though the importance of the particle
size was not recognized until after the critical date.84 The court cited Abbott
Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for the proposition that the
limitation does not have to be appreciated to reduce an invention to practice
and hence to make it ready for patenting.85 If this is the case, it raises the
question and possibility that there may be situations in which, to be
equitable, ready for patenting should not be held to occur until after
reduction to practice.
F.

The Offer

The other part of the Supreme Court's two-part test requires a
commercial “offer for sale.”86 Prior to Pfaff, the on sale bar could be met
by commercial activity which did not rise to the level of a formal “offer”
under contract law principles.87 Activities such as preliminary negotiations,
price quotations, and advertisements were sufficient to constitute an “offer
for sale.” 88 Following the Pfaff decision, the Federal Circuit addressed the
question of what legally constitutes “on-sale.” In Group One, Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc.,89 the Federal Circuit determined that the
“commercial offer for sale” prong of the Pfaff on sale analysis requires a
formal offer under contract law. According to the court, “only an offer
which rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, one which the other
party could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance (assuming
consideration), constitutes an offer for sale under § 102(b).”90 The Federal
Circuit also held that the question of whether a commercial activity
qualifies as an offer is a question of Federal Circuit law as distinguished
from the law of any particular state. At the same time, the court
acknowledged that the Uniform Commercial Code was a “useful, though
not authoritative, source” for determining the meaning of the terms used by
the parties.91 Recently, the objective clarity in the Group One standard may

82

Id. at 1330-31.
Id. at 1321-1325.
Id. at 1325-1326.
85
Id. at 1331 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318-1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
86
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
87
RCA, 887 F.2d at 1062.
88
See e.g. State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 639 F.Supp. 937 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Reactive Metals
and Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
89
254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
90
Id. at 1048. In that case, the offer consisted of the written inquiry: “We could provide the machine
and/or the technology and work on a license/royalty basis.” Id. at 1044.
91
Id. at 1047.
83
84

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol30/iss2/1

2004]

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ON SALE BAR

193

have been threatened by the court’s decision in Lacks Industries, Inc. v.
McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc. 92 In that case, the court
reversed a holding of invalidity because the lower court failed to consider
evidence of industry practices in determining whether the promotional
activities of the patentee constituted an offer for sale. The court, in an
opinion authored by Judge Michel, instructed:
On remand the district court (or Special Master) should
resolve whether or not it needs to take additional evidence
on sales practice in the automotive industry to determine if
the sales promotion activities by Lacks rise to a contractual
offer for sale (and, of course, take such evidence if
necessary).93
Judge Newman dissented, reasoning:
Determination of whether there has been an offer of sale in
terms of § 102(b) requires objective application of uniform
contract law, not indulgence based on disputed local
custom in the automobile tire wheel cladding business. . . .
In developing uniform national law it is as important that
the law be consistent across [sic] industry boundaries as it
is across state boundaries. Such consistency is undermined
by the majority's new accommodation to assertions of
idiosyncratic industry patterns of dealing. While principles
of federalism counsel against imposing a possibly alien
legal standard upon transactions that are primarily matters
of state law, such as the law of sales, the panel majority is
not here invoking the guidance of state law, but of practices
ostensibly peculiar to a segment of the automotive industry
-- practices unencumbered by state law, indeed unknown,
uncodified, and variable.94
The Federal Circuit has consistently distinguished the offer for sale
of a product from the offer of a license. While the former bars a patent, the
latter does not.95 An offer to enter into a license under a patent for the
future sale of the invention is not an offer for sale.96 Similarly, providing
potential customers with samples of a product, without providing any other
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terms, has been held not to constitute a commercial offer for sale because
the recipient could not act in such a way that would create a contract.97
However, even a commercial offer to sell the invention to the patentee
initiated by the buyer can lead to a bar in the same way that an offer to sell
the invention to a third party can lead to a bar.98
III.

EXPERIMENTAL USE -- NEGATION OF THE ON SALE BAR

In Pfaff, the Supreme Court made it clear that the experimental use
exception lives on. The court distinguished the sale in Pfaff as “commercial
rather than experimental in character.”99 The court also referenced City of
Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Company100 and thereby
indicated that within the context of Pfaff’s two-pronged analysis, the
exception of activities that are genuinely experimental has not changed.
The experimental use exception is more accurately described as the
experimental use negation because the experimental nature of the activity
negates the on sale bar. The strict statutory limitation of the on sale bar
prevents inventors from putting their inventions on sale or in public use
prior to one year before filing. In City of Elizabeth and its progeny, the
courts have recognized that in some cases it is necessary to test an invention
in the public view for extended periods of time in order to determine
whether the invention will work for its intended purpose.101 The
experimental use exception recognizes that there may be uses or sales of the
invention by or on behalf of the inventor that are primarily for the purpose
of experimentation which may occur prior to the prescribed one-year
statutory period.102 Accordingly, the experimental use exception “negates”
the application of the on sale bar in instances where the sale is principally
motivated by a need to experiment to bring the invention to perfection or to
determine whether it will work for its intended purpose.103 However, this
exception is limited by the inventor's intention to commercially exploit the
invention.104 Thus, courts assess whether a sale was primarily for the
purpose of experimentation or for the purpose of commercially exploiting
the invention.105 As with the on sale doctrine, courts rely on the policies
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that underlie the experimental use exception in determining the
applicability of experimental use in cases involving the on sale bar.106
A.

History of the Experimental Use Exception

The experimental use exception was firmly established by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case City of Elizabeth,107 which involved a
public use. In that case, an inventor had patented a pavement that he had
used on a section of a private toll road for six years before he applied for
the patent.108 The City of Elizabeth Court claimed that the patent was
invalid because the pavement had been in public use for more than the
prescribed statutory period.109 The inventor claimed that his activities were
experimental, namely, for the purpose of testing the durability of the
pavement.110 In order to be useful on roadways the pavement had to be
permanent and durable.111 The inventor had monitored the results almost
daily for six years and upon becoming convinced that his pavement worked
as a useful and durable road, he applied for a patent on it.112 The court held
that the public testing did not constitute public use as “it is the interest of
the public, as well as [the inventor], that the invention should be perfect and
properly tested, before a patent is granted for it."113 The court further stated
that "[t]he use of an invention . . . by way of experiment, and in order to
bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as such a [public]
use."114
Courts have relied on the policies surrounding the on sale bar and
experimental use in defining the exception and, in turn, defining the on sale
bar itself.115 The Federal Circuit has outlined a number of critical factors
that it takes into consideration as part of the analysis in determining
whether the experimental use exception applies to inventions that have been
on sale or subject to an offer for sale prior to the critical date.116
B.

Policies Underlying Experimental Use
The experimental use doctrine is essentially a balance of two
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policies.117 It weighs the policy which favors the inventor in allowing time
to test and perfect the invention and to assess its utility against the policy
which prevents inventors from extending the statutory period of monopoly
by delaying filing while commercially exploiting the invention.118 The
Supreme Court explained the experimental use doctrine in Pfaff this way:
[A]n inventor who seeks to perfect his discovery may
conduct extensive testing without losing his right to
obtain a patent for his invention – even if such testing
occurs in the public eye. The law has long recognized
the distinction between inventions put to experimental
use and products sold commercially.119
The Court then relied upon City of Elizabeth to explain the rationale of
experimental use:
It is sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue
advantage over the public by delaying to take out a patent,
inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly to himself
for a longer period then is allowed by the policy of the law;
but this cannot be said with justice when the delay is
occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring his invention to
perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the
purpose intended. His monopoly only continues for the
allotted period, in any event; and it is the interest of the
public, as well as himself, that the invention should be
perfect and properly tested, before a patent is granted for it.
Any attempt to use it for a profit, and not by way of
experiment, for a longer period than [two years] before the
application, would deprive the inventor of his right to a
patent.120
Thus, one of the rationales of the experimental use doctrine is to further the
public interest by allowing inventors to “perfect” their inventions before
applying for a patent. In that regard, the public will be able to enjoy
inventions that are “complete” and work for their intended purpose.
Furthermore, the experimental use doctrine allows inventors to experiment
with their inventions to “completion,” rather than having to expeditiously
file an application for a patent on a half-baked invention subsequent to a
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public use or sale. Nonetheless, the sale must be primarily for experimental
purposes; any sale or offer for sale rendered otherwise would invalidate the
patent if the transaction occurred before the critical date.
C.

Factors Considered in Determining Experimental Use

The Federal Circuit, in a series of cases involving the experimental
use doctrine, has outlined the significant factors that it uses to determine
whether a sale or use is for experimental purposes.121 Factors such as the
inventor's intent to commercially exploit the invention, the amount of
control over the invention exercised by the inventor following the sale, and
the extent of commercial exploitation in relation to the purpose of
experimentation, along with other factors, were assessed in a “totality of the
circumstances” approach in determining whether the experimental use
exception should apply in negating the application of the on sale bar.122
1.

Commercial Intent

Courts have looked at the inventor's purpose in commercially
exploiting his invention as one factor in determining whether or not the
sale/commercialization qualifies for the experimental use exception.123 If
the use is primarily commercial rather than experimental, then the on sale
bar will apply.124 The inventor's subjective intent is of little relevance.125
Instead, courts look at the objective evidence to assess the purpose of the
sale.126 For example, an inventor may claim at trial that his intentions were
primarily for the purpose of experimentation, but if the objective evidence
is otherwise, the experimental use exception may not apply.
In addition, the inventor’s profit on the sale is not a controlling
factor in the application of the experimental use doctrine.127 For instance, if
an inventor makes no profit or loses money in a sale but his objective is
commercial rather than experimental, the on sale bar may still apply. On
the other hand, if the inventor benefits commercially from the sale, but the
primary purpose of the sale is experimental, the experimental use exception
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may apply.128 The Federal Circuit looks at an inventor’s profit motive
rather than actual profit received in determining whether the on sale bar has
been revoked.129 Receipt of payment is usually indicative of commercial
intent. In addition, the amount of the payment for the invention is a factor
which courts look at in determining experimental use.130 A sale for full
price may be viewed as a bar rather than as an experimental use.131
However, mere reimbursement to the inventor for the cost of the invention
does not necessarily constitute experimental use.132 The courts look at the
“totality of the circumstances” involved with the sale.133 In essence, the
commercial exploitation must be incidental to the primary purpose of
experimentation for the experimental use exception to apply.134
2.

Inventor's Control Over the Invention Following Sale

Another important factor that courts have used frequently to assess
whether a use is experimental or commercial is the amount of control that
the inventor exercised over his invention.135 Courts reason that an
inventor's lack of control over his experiment after a sale or public use
shows that the motivation behind the sale or use is not experimental.136 In
Lough v. Brunswick,137 the Federal Circuit reasoned that “control is
critically important, because, if the inventor has no control over the alleged
experiments, he is not experimenting. If he does not inquire about the
testing or receive reports concerning the results, similarly, he is not
experimenting.” 138 Evidence of control may include that the inventor kept
progress records of the invention.139 On the other hand, a lack of progress
reports by the inventor may indicate the lack of experimental purpose and
result in an on sale bar.140
3.

Other Factors
In addition to the inventor’s commercial purpose and control over
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his invention, there are a number of other factors which courts have
considered in assessing whether a sale was for the primary purpose of
experimentation. The length of the test period and its relation to the nature
of the invention is also important in determining experimental use.141 The
test period should be reasonable in relation to the time period necessary to
test whether the invention will work for its intended purpose.142 For
example, an invention such as a pavement for which durability is material
to the invention may require more time for experimentation.143
Other factors that courts have considered relate to the transaction
between the inventor and purchaser. A confidentiality agreement may
show that the sale was for experimental purposes.144 However, the
existence of a confidentiality agreement is not controlling.145 In addition,
one case holds that the purchaser must be aware of the experimentation at
the time of the use or sale.146 An explicit clause in the agreement that the
transaction is for experimental purposes may help show experimental use,
but is certainly not dispositive of experimental use.147
One form of testing which courts have scrutinized under the
experimental use exception is market testing.148 Testing to see how the
market will accept the product does not fall within the experimental use
doctrine. The rationale is that this type of testing is primarily for
commercializing the invention and not for testing function or performance,
and thus results in the on sale bar.149 Additionally, experimental use only
negates a statutory bar when the testing addresses the claimed features of
the invention or properties or performance considerations that are inherent
to them.150
4.

Effect of Reduction to Practice

According to City of Elizabeth, the rationale behind the
experimental use doctrine is to further public interest by allowing inventors
to perfect their inventions before applying for a patent. But, what does it
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mean to “perfect” an invention and at what point under the Pfaff ready for
patenting analysis does this right to conduct experimentation end? In Piher,
S.A. v. CTS Corporation.,151 the court held “reduction to practice is not
synonymous with mechanical perfection; all that is required [for reduction
to practice] is a demonstration of practical efficacy and utility.”152 The
plain language of the City of Elizabeth decision suggests that permissible
experimentation might extend beyond the reduction to practice of an
invention. However, the Federal Circuit appears to construe the concept of
“perfecting the invention” synonymously with reduction to practice; a
reduction to practice occurs when an invention is “perfected” and an
invention is “perfected” when it works for its intended purpose.153
During the period when the courts relied upon the “on hand”
standard and subsequently the “reduction to practice” standard in assessing
the stage of development of an invention, the experimental use doctrine was
applied with respect to activities that occurred after the invention had been
reduced to practice.154 Logically, this made sense because under these
standards the on sale bar could be invoked only after a reduction to practice.
Therefore, application of the experimental use exception to negate the
effect of the offer or sale would occur only after reduction to practice.
After the Federal Circuit changed the standard and held that an invention
may be subject to the on sale bar before it is reduced to practice,155 a split
developed between cases that held that experimental use can apply after an
invention is reduced to practice and those that held otherwise.156 More
recently, the Federal Circuit has consistently held that once an invention is
reduced to practice, the experimental use defense is no longer available.157
In Aerovox Corporation v. Polyment Manufacturing Corporation,158
General Motors Corporation v. Bendix Aviation Corporation,159 and Atlas
v. Eastern AirLines, Inc.,160 the inventions all were held to have been
reduced to practice and subsequent testing qualified as experimental. But in
these cases the courts equated reduction to practice with simply the
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availability of a working model of the invention and excepted, as
permissible experimentation, testing to confirm that the invention was
suitable for its intended purpose. Nevertheless, consistent with the
conventional understanding of “bring[ing] the invention to perfection” in
City of Elizabeth,161 the courts have generally held that testing to confirm
commercial suitability does not invoke the on sale bar.
Manville Sales Corporation v. Paramount Systems, Inc.162 involved
an invention for an iris arm luminaire pole.163 The invention was tested in a
lab but was further tested in public at a rest stop to determine its durability
to different winter conditions.164 The court held that “when durability in an
outdoor environment is inherent to the purpose of an invention, then further
testing to determine the invention's ability to serve that purpose will not
subject the invention to a §102(b) bar.”165 Here, the inventor had a working
model but needed to ascertain that it would work for its intended purpose,
namely, to endure the winter conditions of Wyoming. In Baker Oil Tools,
Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc.,166 the court dismissed the district court's reasoning
that an admission by the inventor during interference hearings that the
invention was reduced to practice excluded the application of the
experimental use defense.167 The Federal Circuit, in RCA Corp v. Data
Gen. Corp.,168 held that “experimental use, which means perfecting or
completing an invention to the point of determining that it will work for its
intended purpose, ends with an actual reduction to practice.”169
Can there be “experimental” sales or uses after an invention is
reduced to practice? Although the Supreme Court does not address the
issue directly, the court states in dicta, “It is true that reduction to practice
ordinarily provides the best evidence that an invention is complete.”170
Additionally, in footnote 12, the court notes: “Several of this Court's early
decisions stating that an invention is not complete until it has been reduced
to practice are best understood as indicating that the invention's reduction to
practice demonstrated that the concept was no longer in an experimental
phase.”171 It appears from footnote 12 that the court perceives that once an
invention is reduced to practice, it is no longer in the experimental phase
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and further experimentation would not be excepted under the experimental
use exception. It also appears from footnote 12 that the court believes that
the stage of development of the invention is a critical factor to consider in
determining whether the offer for sale is primarily commercial or
experimental in nature.172 But, if the offer for sale is affiliated with an
inventor’s bona fide objective to “perfect” the invention, will the offer for
sale bar the invention regardless of whether the invention is in fact reduced
to practice? It does not appear so. Footnote 12 suggests that reduction to
practice represents the outer limit for any public experimental activity that
the inventor might expect would not otherwise trigger the on sale bar.173
IV.
A.

APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

Overview

Development agreements frequently include provisions for the
development and transfer of prototypes. These events often are used as
milestones that trigger payments or further performance under the
agreements. In some cases, as part of a co-development agreement, one
party may supply the other with a prototype or product for use in testing
and further development of the invention as in the Elan case discussed
below. While in many cases the parties are likely to view the development
agreement as a contract for services in which one party uses its technical
expertise to design and develop or assist in the design and/or development
of a product for the other, provisions in the agreement for supplying
prototypes or for supplying the product on a commercial basis can effect an
offer or sale that will trigger the statutory bar unless the offer or sale
qualifies as an experimental use of the invention. This may be true
regardless of whether the agreement actually ties the delivery of the
prototypes to the receipt of a specific amount of monetary consideration.
In Zacharin v. United States,174 Zacharin, an engineer working for
the U.S. Army, developed a ram air decelerator or “RAD.”175 The Army
entered into a four-phase development program with the Breed Corporation
to develop the RAD as part of a submunition system.176 The first contract
covered two phases of the program, and the second contract covered the
third phase and provided for the construction and delivery of six thousand
RAD units.177 The second contract was executed more than a year before
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Zacharin’s patent application was filed.178 Zacharin stipulated that the
invention had been reduced to practice prior to entering the second contract
and he did not challenge the sale under the experimental use exception.179
The second contract included supply provisions based on a cost plus
incentive fee.180 Zacharin argued that “the [second] contract did not
constitute a commercial offer to sell the invention, because [it] was not a
supply contract with fixed unit prices and a definite delivery schedule.”181
The court disagreed.182 Quoting from its 1985 decision in In re Caveney,
the court stated: “[A] sale is ‘a contract between parties to give and pass
rights of property for consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay
the seller for the thing bought or sold.’”183 Importantly, the court
distinguished Zacharin’s supply agreement from a contract for development
services noting: “This case is not one in which the inventor took his design
to a fabricator ‘and paid the fabricator for its services in fabricating a few
sample products.’” 184 The court also noted that under its precedent, the
patent was barred regardless of the fact that the contract was made by a
third party and the products were supplied at the buyer’s direction as
opposed to the seller’s direction.
In Netscape Communications Corporation v. Konrad,185 the Federal
Circuit held that Konrad’s offer to create a remote database object system
for the Superconducting Super Collider Laboratory, in exchange for four
months full-time employment, constituted an offer for sale of the invention
and invalidated his patents under § 102(b).186 Konrad had developed the
system while working under a Department of Energy (“DOE”) contract at
the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and contended that because his work at
the laboratories was commonly funded by the DOE, at all times, the
invention remained under the control of the DOE and no sale had
occurred.187 The offer was embodied in a memorandum purchase order that
Konrad contended was merely an accounting convenience for tracking the
transfer of research funds between two DOE laboratories, and therefore did
not involve the sale of a commercial embodiment of the invention.188 In a
decision authored by Judge Mayer,189 the Federal Circuit disagreed.190
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According to the court, the DOE did not exercise such control over the two
laboratories so as to render them the same legal entity, and a sale had
occurred from one laboratory to the other.191
In Elan Corporation, PLC v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,192 the
Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s holding of patent invalidity under
the on sale bar.193 Elan had sent Lederle and several other large
pharmaceutical companies letters offering to partner with one of them in the
development and FDA registration of an extended release tablet form of the
drug naproxen.194 In the letter, Elan set forth licensing fees and proposed a
relationship under which Elan would supply the tablets to the partnering
drug company and the partner would package and resell the product with a
margin of at least 70%.195 The district court held that these activities barred
the patent on the extended release tablet.196 Elan’s letter proposed three
different transactions that could have created an on sale bar: first, the
license offer itself (admittedly, as discussed earlier, the Federal Circuit has
consistently indicated that licensing does not qualify as a bar); second, the
offer to supply the tablets at a price that would permit a 70% margin after
packaging and resale; and third, the inherent commitment by Elan to make
tablets available for clinical studies in conjunction with the FDA approval
process. The Federal Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Lourie,197 did
not find that any of these activities barred the invention.198 The court noted:
The letter to Lederle is clear on its face that Elan was not
offering to sell naproxen tablets to Lederle, but rather
granting a license under the patent and offering Lederle the
opportunity to become its partner in the clinical testing and
eventual marketing of such tablets at some indefinite point
in the future.199
The court also sent the patent bar a warning against misusing the
licensing exception and further noted:
Of course, if Elan had simply disguised a sales price as a
licensing fee it would not avoid triggering the on-sale bar.
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Nonetheless, that is not what Elan did here. If Lederle had
accepted Elan's offer, it would have owed Elan $500,000 at
contract signing and additional amounts at various
milestones in the collaboration. There is no statement in the
letter of how many tablets Elan would supply in exchange
for those funds, and there is no suggestion that the number
of tablets supplied would depend in any way on those
payments (although the payments were to be keyed to the
number of patients enrolled in clinical trials per the fifth
paragraph of the letter).200
The Elan court might have gone a step further in justifying its decision and
observed that the Lederle letter did not clearly indicate that the parties
intended to effect a transfer of title to the tablets to Lederle. For example,
Lederle could have been expected to test the tablets on behalf of Elan.
These cases demonstrate that the on sale bar raises very important
considerations for both negotiating and drafting development agreements
that provide for or involve the delivery of prototypes and/or products.
When the delivery of prototypes is part of a potential agreement, the
supplier-prospective patent applicant must be careful because he or she can
create the basis for the on sale bar prior to actually delivering the product
and, depending on how carefully the negotiations are conducted, prior to
executing the agreement. Even if the agreement is not signed, the bar can
arise if offers that could be accepted to form a binding agreement are made
in the course of the negotiations. Under Group One, if a party puts an offer
on the table that the other party can accept, the on sale bar arises. The offer
is a bar even if it is rejected. In order to avoid this result, a patent
application should be filed within the critical year. Otherwise, development
agreements should be negotiated and drafted such that they do not include a
commercial offer to sell the invention, whether it is in the form of a
commitment to manufacture and deliver a prototype, or it is in the form of a
commercial supply agreement. If this is not practical, then an effort should
be made to structure the agreements so that the testing and evaluation of the
prototypes qualify as an experimental use.
Offers to transfer or sell products that have been reduced to
practice, but not disclosed in a patent application, should be avoided
because they can have serious and undesirable ramifications for the
inventor. They place the inventor in a position of having to guess when the
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invention is “ready for patenting,” and the statutory year begins to run.201
B.

Avoiding the Offer for Sale

One approach to avoiding the on sale bar is to make it clear in the
development agreement that title to the product or prototypes is not being
transferred. This can be done by following the dicta in Zacharin and
drafting the agreement as a development services agreement and by
expressly stating that the prototypes are and shall continue to remain the
property of the inventor-supplier. For example, the agreement might be
structured such that the parts or raw materials from which the prototypes
are made are purchased by or on behalf of the party who will ultimately
receive the prototype, and the party supplying the product is simply paid a
construction fee.
Another approach to avoiding the on sale bar is to structure the
agreement such that the transfer may qualify as an experimental use.
Merely providing a prototype for testing, however, will not be sufficient to
constitute experimental use; the invention cannot have been reduced to
practice.202 To give the agreement the best opportunity to qualify as an
experimental use, the agreement preferably should provide that the results
of the evaluation of the prototypes will be shared with the inventor and used
to improve or perfect the invention. Depending on the nature of the
invention and the required testing, the prototypes should be returned to the
inventor at the completion of the evaluation. The prototypes also should be
provided with restrictions on their use and confidentiality. If the prototype
is being tested by the non-inventor party because the inventor does not have
the facilities or because the non-inventor is in a better position to test and
evaluate the ability of the prototypes to satisfy their intended use, the
agreement could reflect these facts. In any case, it is important that the
results of the testing are shared with the inventor. If the inventor is not
involved in the evaluation of the results, the purpose of the transfer may not
be considered experimental.203 Delivery of the prototype without further
inventor involvement is indicative of a commercial sale. The agreement
might also be structured to provide specifically for post-test services and
collaboration to provide further evidence that the testing was performed to
improve the invention. Again, the language of an agreement will not trump
reality. Under current authority, if the invention has been reduced to
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practice it is not eligible for the experimental use exception.204
C.

Supply Commitments

Another area in which an offer for sale can arise in the context of a
development agreement is in provisions relating to the commercial supply
of the product. In many instances, the inventor-technology supplier may
not be willing to enter into a development agreement unless he or she has
the right to manufacture and supply the product. For example, many
manufacturers take the position that they are not “in the research business,”
meaning that they are not willing to commit their engineering capabilities to
a project unless they are guaranteed that they will at least be considered for
a manufacturing and supply agreement when the invention is
commercialized. In these instances, development agreements often include
manufacturing and supply provisions.
For example, the agreements may include provisions for delivery,
price, price adjustments, second source, and product liability
indemnification. These provisions may constitute a commercial offer to
sell the invention such that one year after the offer or one year after the
invention is ready for patenting, whichever is later, patent protection will be
barred if an application disclosing the invention has not been filed. In order
to avoid this result, the practitioner can consider several strategies. Of
course, the supply commitments could be left to a subsequent agreement
that the parties negotiate in good faith, although this may not provide much
comfort to the inventor-supplier. Another approach to avoiding a
potentially barring offer is to have the purchaser give the supplier a right of
first offer or a right of first refusal to supply the product. Alternatively, the
development agreement may be structured such that commitments
regarding the sale or offer to sell the product are clearly contingent upon
some future event, such as successful testing of the product.
For instance, the agreement might read:
Contingent upon
successful development and testing of the invention, the inventor-supplier
agrees to offer to sell and the purchaser agrees to buy its entire
requirements for the invention on the terms set forth in the agreement itself
or an appended supply agreement. Another approach that may also avoid
the bar is to state that contingent upon successful testing, the inventorsupplier and the buyer agree to execute a supply agreement that is attached
as a separate document and has all the terms of the sale, including price,
delivery, indemnification, etc. set forth therein. For reasons discussed
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below, arguably this agreement to contract to supply does not constitute an
offer because it cannot be converted to a contract for sale by simple
acceptance.
In summary, when addressing supply provisions in a development
agreement for an invention that has not been disclosed in a patent
application, the agreement should very clearly indicate that the offer does
not occur unless a condition precedent, such as successful testing, has been
satisfied. An approach in which the inventor-supplier and the prospective
licensee-purchaser evaluate test results, and in which their future dealings
are contingent upon successfully completing the testing, has the dual
advantage of evincing an experimental objective and postponing the
occurrence of any contractually binding offer for sale.
Under Group One, as currently construed by the Federal Circuit,
strategies such as those outlined here should be successful in avoiding the
on sale bar. In Group One, the court noted that one advantage of requiring
an offer that is sufficient is that it can be accepted and made into a binding
contract: “Applying established concepts of contract law, rather than some
amorphous test, implements the broad goal of Pfaff . . . to bring greater
certainty to the analysis of the [on sale] bar.”205 In Pfaff, the Supreme
Court justified its on sale approach stating: “An inventor can both
understand and control the timing of the first commercial marketing of his
invention.”206
In summary, as currently construed by the Federal Circuit, Pfaff
and Group One appear to give inventors more control over the
ramifications of their commercial activities. Inventors that find themselves
parties to a development agreement, and that have satisfied the commercial
offer for sale prong of the Pfaff test by contracting for the sale and delivery
of prototypes, may elect to apply for a patent within a year of the date of the
offer. Under Group One, the inventor-supplier’s exposure to the on sale bar
can be controlled by constructing development agreements to avoid or
postpone the offer for sale, and if the invention has not been reduced to
practice, by controlling the use of any prototypes so that the activities under
the agreement may qualify as an experimental use.
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